Donnchadh O'Conaill
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Work in progress

'Against Universalism: The Problem of Particularityʼ
Universalism is the position that the only fundamental entities are universals: “the world is a construction from, is constituted by, universals” (Armstrong 1989, 73).  I shall outline a new problem for universalism, the problem of particularity: in a world which has only universals as its fundamental entities, why do any particulars exist at all? 


‘Temporal Modes of Presentation and the Experience of Passage’
It is often claimed that in perception we experience temporal passage; that is, we experience times or events as passing from the future into the present and then into the past. The experience of passage is often cited as a reason to believe that tense is a feature of reality. Opponents of this claim typically argue either that we do not have an experience of passage, or that we experience passage but this experience is illusory.
I shall outline an account of the experience of passage which fits into neither of these responses offered by opponents of passage. On this account, it is true that time seems to pass, but it is not the case that our experiences present this passage as a mind-independent feature of reality. Therefore, experiences of passage do not provide reason to think that tense is a feature of reality, but these experiences would not be illusory even if reality turns out to not be tensed.









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